Hierarchies of Consistency Strength (From Gödel to Feferman)

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Hierarchies of consistency strength rank formal theories by what they can prove about the consistency of other theories. If a theory A proves Con(B) (“B is consistent”), then A is stronger than B. Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem implies that no sufficiently strong, consistent theory proves its own consistency; hence, foundations unfold as an unending ladder of stronger systems (Feferman), often measured via proof-theoretic ordinals.

From Gödel’s Limit to a Ladder

IdeaFormal ContentConsequence
Gödel IINo consistent, arithmetic-capable theory proves Con(T) about itself.Self-certification is impossible.
Relative consistencyA ⊢ Con(B)A stronger than B.
HierarchyIterate: B < A < A' etc.Infinite ascent of strength.

Landmarks in the Hierarchy

LevelRepresentative TheoryCan Prove Consistency OfBut Not
1Fragments of arithmetic (IΔ0, EFA)Weaker fragmentsThemselves
2PA (Peano Arithmetic)Fragments; elementary arithmeticCon(PA)
3ZFC (Zermelo–Fraenkel + Choice)PA; many arithmetic theoriesCon(ZFC)
4ZFC + Inaccessible cardinalZFCIts own consistency
5ZFC + Measurable cardinalZFC + InaccessibleIts own consistency
Stronger large-cardinal axiomsWeaker large-cardinal theoriesSelf-consistency

Measuring Strength: Proof-Theoretic Ordinals

Modern proof theory (Gentzen, Feferman, et al.) assigns ordinals as “coordinates of strength.” Examples:

TheoryApprox. OrdinalNotes
PAε₀Gentzen’s 1936 proof used transfinite induction up to ε₀ to show Con(PA)—but in a stronger meta-theory.
Predicative AnalysisΓ₀Feferman–Schütte analysis of predicative provability.
Beyond predicativitymuch larger ordinalsLinked to large cardinals; towers of reflection principles.

Reflection Principles and Iteration

Why It Matters

AreaRelevance
FoundationsReplaces the search for “the” foundation with a calibrated hierarchy of stronger frameworks.
Set TheoryLarge cardinals organize high-level strength; consequences cascade down to arithmetic.
PhilosophyEpistemic humility: every lens needs a wider lens; no final self-grounding.
ComputationParallels with hierarchies of computability and oracle strength (Turing jumps).

Summary

Consistency strength forms an ascending ladder: stronger theories verify the safety of weaker ones, yet none verifies itself. Proof-theoretic ordinals and large-cardinal axioms chart this ascent with remarkable precision.

References

  1. Feferman, S. (1998). In the Light of Logic. Oxford University Press.
  2. Gentzen, G. (1936). Die Widerspruchsfreiheit der reinen Zahlentheorie. Mathematische Annalen.
  3. Gödel, K. (1931). Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I. Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft.
  4. Turing, A. M. (1936). On computable numbers, with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem. Proc. London Mathematical Society, 2(42), 230–265.